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Introduction
Yugoslavia existed as federation of six socialist republics since the end of the
Yugoslav Civil War (1941–1945) until its violent dissolution in the 1990s. This
federation was ruled by one man, a socialist dictator named Josip Broz Tito (1945-1980)
under whose broad policy of "Brotherhood and Unity" the ethnic component of the Civil
War never officially entered the history books in the former Yugoslavia. Even so, the
butchery committed by all parties—the German and Italian occupiers, the Ustasha
(Croatian fascists), and the Chetnik and Partisan resistance movements—was not
forgotten. The lack of reconciliation in the years after the Civil War drove a wedge
between the Yugoslav peoples, and, bereft of any credible information, the Yugoslav
public was misled by self-serving politicians during the decade after Tito’s death into
violent ethnic nationalism, thus splintering the Yugoslav state. A careful examination of
the rhetoric employed by former Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, in the years
between 1987 and 1992, when compared to recent scholarly investigations into the actual
events of the Yugoslav Civil War of the 1940s, 1 will show that the creation of an official
history (by Tito’s government) that ignored the ethnic dimension of the War left that
aspect of the conflict available to be used as a tool for ethnic nationalism after Tito’s
death in 1980. This maltreatment of history—by Tito and by the nationalist leaders that
came to power in the late 1980s—demonstrates the need for reconciliation between the
participants of an ethnic war and a balanced scholarly discourse concerning the knowable

1

This paper will only include the analysis of those speeches that are available in English-language
transcripts. Doubtlessly, however, a closer examination of Serbo-Croatian sources would show similar
patterns in Milosevic’s rhetoric. Recent investigations of the Yugoslavia during its civil war between 1941
and 1945 have focused on the examination of primary source material that I am unable to access. This
material includes, but is in no way limited to, German, Italian and British war archives, personal
testimonies of survivors of the Yugoslav Civil War, as well as personal and diplomatic correspondence.
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facts of the event. This examination will be preceded by some comments about the
context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a brief historical overview of the region, and an
introductory analysis of the rise of ethnic nationalism before the death of Tito.

Context of the Problem
On March 11, 1990, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union,
thus beginning the disintegration of the socialist federations of Eastern Europe. By
August of 1991 most of the former soviet republics had done the same, all with limited
violence. On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully divided itself along ethnic lines
in what became known as the “velvet divorce.” Therefore, in the early 1990s following
the end of the cold war, Yugoslavia was one of the three multi-ethnic, formerly socialist
states to undergo division. 2 How then can the violence that accompanied the dissolution
of Yugoslavia be explained when the same process was experienced elsewhere with
relative non-violence? The mechanisms by which the changes were brought about differ.
In the two “peaceful” cases just mentioned, ethnic nationalism surfaced because of the
fall of socialism, whereas the research presented in this paper indicates that in Yugoslavia
ethnic nationalism actually brought about the fall of the socialist political institutions. 3

2

Gojko Vuckovic. “Failure of Socialist Self-Management to Create a Viable Nation-State, and
Disintegration of the Yugoslav Administrative State and State Institutions,” East European Quarterly 32,
no. 3 (1998): 353.
3
Omer Fisher notes in his chapter of New Approaches to Balkan Studies titled “Transition and
Disruption in Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective” that “Of the formerly communist countries that
experienced a change in political regime starting from the eighties, all socialist federations broke up, and
none of the unitary states collapsed. Furthermore, the disintegration of these federations produced an
almost one-to-one correspondence between republics of the federations and new independent states.” In
this chapter Fisher examines the differences between the three cases of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia. He concludes that the violent transition in Yugoslavia is due to the particulars of the
liberalization phase of Yugoslav politics, the discontinuous nature of this transition, and the “degree of
violent center-periphery mobilization.” He provides valuable insights into the nature of socialist
federations, but does not address the ethnic dimension of the Yugoslav conflict, the very dimension that I
believe accounts for the violent conflict between the Serbian center of Yugoslavia and its multi-ethnic

4
It is significant to note that unlike other socialist states whose governments
carried on after the decline of their initial socialist dictators, Yugoslavia proved unable to
weather the transition from Tito to another executive leader or group of leaders. Perhaps
this speaks volumes of Tito as a leader of consummate political skill. More likely,
however, it attests to Yugoslavia’s succession problem and its lack of ideological rigidity
even at the highest levels of republican leadership. As a matter of comparison, Soviet
socialism, at least until the ascension of Gorbachev in 1985, was associated with a high
degree of centralism and party leadership. Even in the later stages of its development
there remained a dogmatic element associated with the leader of the Communist Party.
The Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) incorporated no such dogmatism. Gojko
Vuckovic, a respected scholar who specializes in international politics, notes that the
YLC made efforts during Tito’s reign to set policies and pursue socialist ideals, but the
“inconsistency in formulation and interpretation of the Yugoslav nation led to the endless
adjustment of Yugoslav political and administrative institutions.” 4 The most important of
these adjustments were permanent revisions of the Yugoslav constitution between 1948
and 1974 that systematically transferred political and economic power away from the
central government to the constituent Republics. Essentially, Tito’s death marked the end
of the last vestiges of a strong central government in Yugoslavia.

periphery. For more on Fisher’s argument, see: Omer Fisher “Transition and Disruption in Yugoslavia in
Comparative Perspective” in New Approaches to Balkan Studies ed. Keridis, Elias-Bursac, and
Yatromanolakis (Everet, Massachusetts: Fidelity Press, 2003), 149-82.
4
Ibid., 374.
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Methodology
This study is divided into two parts. The first is a brief overview of the history of
Yugoslavia and nationalism in Yugoslavia and the second is a textual analysis of English
language transcripts of several speeches by Slobodan Milosevic prior to 1993. The
overview draws upon a broad range of secondary source material published by respected
authorities in the field of Yugoslav studies. Incorporated into the first part is a more indepth historiography of Serbian nationalism that focuses on a number of secondary
sources published since 1990. This paper does not, however, address most of the
sensationalist literature that flooded the market with the outbreak of the worst violence in
Europe since the Second World War. 5 The analysis of Milosevic’s speeches focuses on
identifying how accounts of historical events were used to inspire nationalist sentiments
among Serbs. My analysis is predicated upon Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism.
Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as
both inherently limited and sovereign.” 6 This powerful statement includes no less than
four important concepts that describe the character of nationalism: imagination,
limitation, sovereignty, and community. Anderson explains each of these in turn.
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of
their fellow members…imagined as limited because even the largest of them,
encompassing perhaps a billion human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries beyond
which lie other nations…imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age
in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinelyordained, hierarchical dynastic realm…[and] imagined as community because, regardless
5

The review article “Instant History” by Gale Stokes and some of his colleagues was instrumental
in weeding through the mountain of literature that has been published about Yugoslavia in the years
immediately following the outbreak of war in the 1990s. Stokes et al discriminate on the basis of the
credentials of the various authors and the academic rigor with which they pursued their works. They
generally speak poorly of most of the books written by journalists who had no prior experience in
Yugoslavia prior to the 1990s. Most of the sources in my historiography of Serbian nationalism were
selected based upon the recommendations of this article. Gale Stokes et al. “Instant History: Understanding
the Wars of Yugoslav Succession” Slavic Review 55 no. 1 (1996).
6
Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (Norfolk: Thetford Press, 1983), 15.
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of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always
conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship. 7

In other words, the idea of belonging to a nation is a recent and constructed concept.
Integral to this concept is the notion of the “Other,” those that lie outside the bounds of
the nation. The Other may be (but does not necessarily have to be) one who speaks
another language, one with different colored skin, the people living on the other side of a
mountain, or any other arbitrary characteristic. Historically, however, language and
ethnicity have been important factors in the defining of imagined communities. Along
with Anderson’s succinct explanation reproduced above, one additional aspect of his
theory is particularly applicable to the Serbian situation—essentially, nationalism maybe
employed—usually by elite members of society—as a means of legitimizing the state. 8
This is known as “official nationalism” and it has been used extensively in Yugoslavia in
the latter half of the twentieth-century.

Historical Overview
Yugoslavia is located on the Balkan Peninsula, a region that has been divided and
contested for centuries. It marked the geographical division of the eastern and western
halves of the Roman Empire as early as the fourth-century A.D. Here the dominions of
Catholicism and Orthodoxy met, and Islam became a major influence, as well, with the
invasion of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth-century. Germans mingled with Slavs,
especially in the northern regions of Croatia and Slovenia, and modern BosniaHerzegovina marked the uneasy frontier between the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs. More
recently still the nation of Yugoslavia stood precariously between the Cold War
7
8

Ibid., 15-16.
Ibid., 145.
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superpowers (physically as well as ideologically, to a certain degree). 9 Even without any
additional information, it would be reasonable to accept that a region divided in so many
different ways for such an extended period of time with relatively brief interludes of
autonomy would be prone to political and ethnic strife, and many western observers of
the 1990s dissolution point to this factor to explain the violence and ethnic cleansing. A
more in-depth chronological overview, however, will show that there is no record of
large-scale inter-Slavic conflict and that ethnic wars and genocide are a product of the
twentieth-century. 10
Autonomy was first secured in the region by Christianized Serbian principalities
that wrested their independence from a decaying Byzantine Empire in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries A.D. At its height under Stevan Dušan (1331–1355), the original
Serbian Empire encompassed Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly, as well as parts
of Bulgaria and present-day Serbia. 11 Its independence, however, was short lived. On
June 28, 1389 (St. Vitus Day) the Serbian Empire lost the Battle of Kosovo to the
encroaching Ottoman Empire, under which it would remain until the nineteenthcentury. 12 This battle is remembered by Serbs as one of the most important events in their
history, certainly the most important to occur before the twentieth century. Many poems
and legends depict the Battle of Kosovo as a crushing military defeat, but it is almost
9

Dusko Doder. “Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds.” Foreign Policy 91 (1993): 5.
In spite of these historical divisions most serious scholars do not agree with the “Ancient ethnic
hatreds” argument to explain the cause of the recent wars in the former Yugoslavia. Arguing against ageold hatreds are scholars such as Christopher Bennett, Jonathan Gumz, Gojko Vuckovic, and Susan
Woodward. For more information see Bennett, Christopher. Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course
and Consequences (London: Hurst & Company), 1995. Jonathan Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency
Policy in Independent Croatia, 1941-1944,” Historian 61, no. 1 (1998): 33-51. http://search.epnet.com/
login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=1355044 (accessed April 1, 2005). Gojko Vuckovic, “Failure of
Socialist Self-Management.” Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold
War (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
11
Mojmir Križan, “New Serbian Nationalism and the Third Balkan War,” Studies in East
European Thought 46 (1994): 47.
12
See: Appendix A “Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, and the Ottoman Empire, 14th-15th centuries.”
10
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universally regarded by Serbs as a moral victory. It is remembered as the battle in which
Serbia defended European culture against the Muslim invaders. Additionally, the Battle
of Kosovo has become the subject of Serbian mythology through the creation of
innumerable commemorative ballads. In the mythological account, the leader of the
Serbian armies, Tsar Lazar, was given the choice between an earthly crown and a
heavenly one. The former would be his if he allowed his forces to crush the invading
Turks, the latter if they willingly accepted defeat. Legend says that he chose the kingdom
of the heaven. 13
As the Ottoman Empire began to decay, Serbia once again managed to secure
autonomy with the expulsion of the Turks in 1862. 14 Serbia survived as an independent
kingdom until the outbreak of the First World War. Afterwards, Croatian and Slovene
desires for independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire loosely corresponded with
Serbian desires for the creation of a Greater Serbian Nation that would include all of the
region’s linguistically similar populations. On December 1, 1918 the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—renamed the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1929—was
created. 15 Although these three peoples were all of the same Slavic race, considerable
cultural differences existed. Croats and Serbs shared the same language, but wrote in
different alphabets—the former in Latin, the latter in Cyrillic. Additionally, these two
ethnic groups had sharply divergent cultural traditions—the Serbs had spent nearly half a
millennium under the dominion of a Muslim (Ottoman Turkish) empire, while the Croats
13

John Matthias. The Battle of Kosovo: Serbian Epic Poems trans. John Matthias and Vladeta
Vuckovic (Athens: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1987), http://www.kosovo.com/history/battle
_of_kosovo.html#s02 (accessed May 17, 2005).
14
Križan, “New Serbian Nationalism,” 49.
15
See: Appendix A, “East Central Europe, 1918-1923,” and “Yugoslavia in the 20th Century, to
1941.” Also note: “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” is literally translated as the “Kingdom of the Southern Slavs.”
See: Helmut Konrad. “Historical Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe,” The History Teacher
25 no. 4 (1992): 447.

9
spent a similar period under Catholic (Hapsburg-Austrian) influence. Perhaps most
importantly, however, Serbs were traditionally Orthodox Christians whereas Croats were
predominantly Roman Catholic. 16 The Slovenes were conquered by the Hapsburgs in
1278, and thus share a similar cultural history with the Croats even though the Slovenian
and Croatian languages are distinct. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia also included
substantial regional minorities of ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Montenegrins, and
Macedonians emphasizing the arbitrary nature of the borders drawn at the end of the First
World War. In this initial formation of the southern Slavic state, often known as the
“First Yugoslavia,” Serbia was the only province that had been an autonomous state in
recent times. 17 It is not surprising then that the first king of the new state would be
Alexander, the former regent of Serbia. 18
Trouble soon beset the young kingdom as the opposing political interests of the
Serbs and Croats made it clear that is would be impossible to agree upon a constitution.
On June 28, 1921 Alexander, in the face of Croatian and Slovene opposition, pushed a
proposed constitution through the parliament that provided for a highly centralized
16

Currently, in the context of a discussion concerning the peoples of the former Yugoslavia
Orthodoxy is synonymous with Serbian as is Roman Catholicism with Croatian, yet this has not always
been the case. At the time of the formation of the first Yugoslavia there were in fact Orthodox Croatians,
Catholic Serbs, and Muslims of both ethnicities. See: Bogdan Denitch. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic
Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 29-30. Additionally, Damir
Mirkovic suggests that although the differences in alphabets and religions cannot be denied, factors such as
urbanization, industrialization, the availability of secular education and interethnic marriages were blurring
the distinctions between Serbs and Croats. Damir Mirkovic. “On Destruction and Self-destruction of
Croatian Serbs: a preliminary draft for a study of genocide,” The South Slav Journal 20, no. 1-2 (1999): 29.
17
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 1990 justifies the legitimacy of its existence by
citing “a thousand-year-long national identity and state existence of the Croatian Nation.” It provides a
chronicle of Croatian statehood from the initial creation of Croatian principalities in the seventh century
through the constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1990) with the intent of justifying
Croatia’s claim to full state sovereignty. For a reproduction of this chronicle in English see: “The
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia: December 22, 1990” in Gale Stokes ed. From Stalinism to
Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945, second ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 285-86.
18
Richard Pintarich. “Yugoslav Sectionalism: Its Past and Reemergence,” Mankind 5 (1976): 36.
See also: Appendix A, “East Central Europe, 1910.”
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government and effectively established himself as a dictator. Little was accomplished
under this system because the Croat opposition, under the leadership of Stephen Radic,
refused to recognize the king’s authority under a constitution that had not been approved
by a two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, Serbian hegemony persisted. This conflict gave
rise in the late 1930s to the Croatian fascist movement, the Ustasha, which would later be
installed as the ruling party of the Independent State of Croatia.
World War II brought untold suffering to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The war in
Yugoslavia was not limited to the invasion of and resistance to the German and Italian
armies. Civil war also erupted as a result of the removal of the central government. By
1939 German occupation was accepted as an unavoidable reality, but easing the
nationalistic tensions within Yugoslavia seemed like the best solution for minimizing the
dismemberment of the state. With this in mind, and after much negotiation, Croatia was
actually granted independence before the Second World War came to Yugoslavia. The
Axis powers finally invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, and the Ustasha under Ante Pavelic
quickly established ties with the invaders. The Croatian fascists freely collaborated with
both the Germans and the Italians and were installed as the rulers of the Independent
State of Croatia, which was expanded to include the Yugoslav province of BosniaHerzegovina. Hence, beginning in 1941, the Ustasha not only participated in the Nazi
program to exterminate the Jews of Europe, but also began their own genocidal program
directed at Serbs and other minorities within the Independent State of Croatia. 19 Jonathan
Gumz, a scholar specializing in the field of holocaust studies, suggests that

19

German officers stationed in the Independent State of Croatia and occupied Yugoslavia
recognized the destabilizing effect that the Ustasha program of genocide had on the Serbian population and
did everything in their limited power to stop it—not out of concern for those being murdered, of course, but
rather for the sake of the stability of the occupied state. Hitler, however, did not share in his officer’s

11
Not only would the genocide meet the Ustasha’s goal of an ethnically pure Croatian
nation, but the Ustasha also believed that it would widen their small political power base
by making all Croatians by virtue of their ethnicity complicit in the genocide. 20

This process of systematic murder was carried out in concentration camps much as it was
in Central Europe. The Ustasha killed some 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs and 8,000 to 20,000
Jews in Jasenovac, the largest of these camps in Croatia. The same source places the total
number of Serbs killed by the Ustasha somewhere between 330,000 and 390,000 and
Jews around 32,000.21
In Serbia another ultra-nationalist group, the Chetniks, 22 under the leadership of
Draza Mihailović supported the Serbian government-in-exile. The Chetniks, based their
resistance on the Serbian peasantry’s traditional pattern of armed self-defense. Village
notables were relied upon to carry out resistance activities in the areas around their
village. This strategy led to a resistance movement that was intimately acquainted with
the local terrain, but ineffective at mobilizing for large-scale resistance activities. 23 At the
other end of the political spectrum, Josip Broz Tito led the Partisans, a communist
concern, and in an often cited statement with General Alexander Lohr maintained that the Croats were
“only letting off a little steam” by killing Serbs. Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy,” 4. Even more
shocking is the evidence provided by Paul Hehn in his article “Serbia, Croatia and Germany 1941-1945”
that Hitler may have “partitioned Yugoslavia to deliberately foster quarrels between national groups to
enable him to dominate the area more easily.” Paul N. Hehn, “Serbia, Croatia, and Germany, 1941-1945:
Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 13, no. 4 (1972): 346.
20
Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy,” 2.
21
Figures on the exact number of Serbs killed in the Ustasha program of genocide vary greatly,
and are largely dependent upon the political motives of the source. Typically Serbian sources tend to
maximize the casualty figures while Croatian sources minimize them. For this paper I have used the
statistics compiled by the United States Holocaust Museum. For more information see: United States
Holocaust Museum “Holocaust Era in Croatia 1941-1945: Jasenovac” http://www.ushmm.org/museum
exhibit/online/jasenovac// (accessed April 14, 2005).
22
The name “Chetnik” had surfaced in recent times in connection with the Bosnian Serb guerillas
operating during World War I, but Mihailović chose it as a name for his forces because of its symbolic
reference to the highland guerilla bands that opposed Ottoman rule. These outlaws—alternatively known as
klephts, haiduks, or haiduts—terrorized trade caravans, often with the support of local villages, during the
Ottoman period and are remembered by rural Serbs as folk heroes. See: John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as
History: Twice there was a country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 201-02. Barbara
Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. 1, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 61.
23
Bogdan Denitch, “Violence and Social Change in the Yugoslav Revolution: Lessons for the
Thrid World?” Comparative Politics 8, no. 3 Special Issue on Peasants and Revolution (1976), 467.
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resistance movement. The most striking difference between the Partisans and the
Chetniks was that while the latter was almost entirely composed of Serbs, 24 the former
actively included members of all Yugoslav ethnicities (although Serbs did compose the
majority of their ranks) under Tito’s communist slogan “Brotherhood and Unity.” In
addition to being a multi-ethnic resistance group, the Partisans formed a much more
mobile force not tied to any particular area. Their leaders were not traditional authority
figures, but rather were usually taken from the rural intelligentsia, especially from
teachers schools. 25 Additionally, the Chetniks engaged in relatively little active resistance
compared to the communist Partisan resistance group led by Tito because they took the
Germans threats of reprisals (and demonstrations thereof) very seriously. 26 Eventually
with allied assistance, the Partisans succeeded in liberating Yugoslavia—including the
Independent State of Croatia—from Nazi and Ustasha occupation, and Tito established
the YLC at the core of the new Yugoslav government under a plan of enforced national
unity and tolerance. 27
It is widely accepted by many historians that without Tito’s charismatic
leadership, Yugoslavia, which incorporated deep-rooted ethnic divisions, would not have
existed for so long. 28 This argument gains more weight when it is considered that, after
the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia was an unaligned socialist state pursuing an

24

In addition to Serbs, some Bosnian Muslim guerilla groups fell under the umbrella of the
Chetnik movement. For more on this see Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, “Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations
between Moslems and Non-Moslems,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5 no. 3 (1990): 282.
25
The Chetniks recognized this pattern of recruitment for the political commissars of the Partisan
forces. According to Bogdan Denitch, this “explains the systematic murder by Chetniks of village
schoolteachers and graduates of teachers’ schools in Serbia and Eastern Bosnia.” Denitch, “Violence and
Social Change,” 467.
26
Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy,” 3.
27
See: Appendix A, “Yugoslavia in the 20th century 1941-1989.”
28
For example see Vuckovic, “Failure of Socialist Self-Management,” 374 or Fisher, “Transition
and Disruption,” 169.
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uncharted course of political development.29 This turned out to be a course leading to
decentralization where Tito’s personal authority eventually became the only effective
remaining element of the central government. Upon his death in 1980, the Yugoslav
central government was too weak to contain the nationalist drives of its constituent
republics. There had been no provisions made for the succession of leadership, and the
presidency shared between the leaders of each of the republics proved completely
ineffectual. Faced with the mounting pressures of ethnic nationalism in each of the
republics and the reality of complete decentralization, the YLC dissolved itself following
the first free elections in 1990 and was followed shortly thereafter by the complete
collapse of the central government. 30

Problems of Nationalism under Tito
During the Civil War of the 1940s, ethnic nationalism had undergone a
transformation from the ideological to the violent and militant. This transformation was
perhaps the most obvious threat to the stability of the Second Yugoslavia that emerged
immediately after World War II. Tito’s policies sought to curb Serbian nationalism in
particular, but a heavy burden of guilt was also placed upon the Croats for their
fanaticism. As a method of legitimizing itself, Tito and the YLC tailored the national
memory of the war to fit a strictly bilateral mold. The communist Partisans fought against
elements of fascism. No distinction was drawn between the Ustasha, Chetniks, and the
Nazis themselves. References to the Partisans use of violence and terror during and
immediately after the war—for example, the killing of thousands of Chetnik and Ustasha
29

For more information about the campaign to abolish Stalinist forms of rule in Yugoslavia see:
Paul Shoup, “The National Question in Yugoslavia,” Problems of Communism 21 (1972): 19.
30
Vuckovic, “Failure of Socialist Self-Management,” 374.
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POWs 31—was not allowed to be called into question and the media was censored to
conform to Tito’s “Brotherhood and Unity” policy. These policies aimed at replacing
ethnic nationalism, namely Serbian and Croatian, nationalism, with an all-encompassing
Yugoslav nationalism. 32 Unfortunately, aside from their unsuccessful experiences within
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the republics that composed Yugoslavia had no similar
history upon which to base a sense Yugoslav national identity.
The failure of the governments of both the First Yugoslavia and the Second to
create an enduring Yugoslav nationalism—a sense of nationalism shared by all the
citizens of the state—illustrates the relative importance of shared cultural memory as
compared to language in the process of fostering nationalism. According to Benedict
Anderson by the end of the First World War, “the legitimate international norm was the
nation-state.”33 In Europe nation-states were typically formed in regions where the
majority of the population spoke the same vernacular. Coincidentally, these were also
regions that shared common cultural traditions (e.g. France, Germany, and later Italy). It
is not surprising then that the First Yugoslavia was created out of two regions, Serbia and
Croatia, where the majority of the population spoke the vernacular known as “SerboCroatian.” The difference between Yugoslavia and other nation-states was that Serbia and

31

Records of these murders are sketchy and are a matter of contention between Serbs and Croats.
Nevertheless it seems that Partisan forces took charge of opposition forces that had fled to Austria to
surrender to the British and disposed of them through a series of death marches. The attention paid in recent
years to most infamous of these marches, the Bleiberg march, became a major contributor to Croatian
nationalism in the 1990s. For more information on this see: Biljana Vankovska, “Military and Society in
War-Torn Balkan Countries: Lessons for Security Sector Reform,” http://www.dcaf.ch/news/MISO/
Biljana.pdf (accessed May 19, 2005).
32
Wolfgang Hoepken, “War, Memory, and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of
Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 13, no. 1 (1999): 197-98.
33
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 104.
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Croatia had very different cultural traditions. 34 Croatia was essentially Austrian in
culture, while Serbs had bitterly clung to their medieval heritage under Turkish
domination for 500 years. This largely accounts for the instability of the first Yugoslavia.
This cultural disparity was further amplified by the events of World War II. Thus, during
the period of the Second Yugoslavia, the constituent republics had almost nothing in
common besides a language and even that was not shared uniformly throughout the
country. 35
Republican nationalism did not disappear after World War II nor were old
grievances forgotten, but in Serbia nationalist sentiments were censored from the media
in accordance with Tito’s “Brotherhood and Unity” policy. In spite of this censorship,
anti-Croatian sentiments smoldered. Popular demonstrations in the 1980s attested to the
fact that Serbia as a whole nursed a grudge against Croatia, its more sophisticated,
industrialized, and seemingly ungrateful neighbor to the northwest. After all, Serbs
remembered that it was they who had sacrificed the most in both World Wars to assure
the autonomy of a Southern Slavic State. Many remembered the crimes committed by the
34

Yugoslavia also included significant minorities of peoples that did not speak Serbo-Croatian
such as the Slovenes, Hungarians, and Albanians. This further contributed to the instability of Yugoslavia
as a nation state.
35
It would be unfair to say that absolutely no one bought into Yugoslav nationalism. According to
the census taken in 1991, 3 percent of Yugoslavia’s 23,528,230 people declared themselves as
“Yugoslavs,”—that is to say that they refused to claim any particular ethnicity. Yet, if Yugoslavs are
considered as a minority they outnumber—of the other substantial minorities—only Montenegrins and
Hungarians (2 percent each) and are less populous than Muslim Slavs (10 percent), Albanians (9 percent),
Slovenes (8 percent), and Macedonian Slavs (6 percent) to say nothing of Serbs (36 percent) and Croats
(20 percent). On the other hand it should be taken into consideration that this census was taken after a
decade of mounting ethnic nationalist sentiments which would have led individuals to declare an ethnicity
other than Yugoslav. Census data from 1971 and 1981 provide at least superficial support for this claim. In
1981 “Yugoslavism” was at a high of 5.4 percent of the total population, which is a considerable increase
from just 1.2 percent in 1971. In other words, at least until the time of Tito’s death, the concept of a
Yugoslav nationality was growing in popularity. Census figures for 1971 and 1981 taken from “Socialist
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Ustasha and they resented the economic prosperity of Croatia. Furthermore, after the war
in which mostly Serbian Partisan forces had secured the liberation of the nation, Serbia
was territorially dismembered by the creation of the republics of Montenegro and
Macedonia and the two autonomous republics of Kosovo and Voyvodina. Even after the
loss of these traditionally Serbian territories, the republic of Serbia was still nearly twice
as populous as the next largest republic (Croatia), but in all formulations of the
government it would receive representation equal to that of any other republic. Especially
troublesome to Serbian nationalism were the abuses perpetrated by ethnic Albanians
against a shrinking minority of Serbs in the autonomous province of Kosovo—the most
important location to Serbian culture since it was the site of their defeat by the Ottomans
in the fourteenth century.

36

The Croatians, however, enjoyed more liberty during the Tito era, and in the early
1970s in particular there was a surge of Croatian nationalist sentiment. Stephen Anderson
writing during this period noted that whereas Serbians were jealous of Croatia’s
prosperity, “Croats have always chafed at what they consider to be exploitation by the
poorer and more backward regions of Yugoslavia—i.e. Serbia Macedonia, Montenegro,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.” 37 It was due to mounting feelings of ethnic nationalism that
Croatia persistently lobbied for republican participation in the central government.
Eventually, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly passed constitutional amendments on June
30, 1971 that provided for increased economic autonomy for the republics as well as
guaranteeing participation in a joint presidential council that would replace Tito upon his
eventual retirement. This constitutional reform sharply curtailed both the power and the
36
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authority of the federal government, limiting its authority primarily to international issues
and relegating it to receiving “contributions” from the republics. 38 Omer Fisher points
that after the constitutional reform, decisions on all matters in the federal parliament
became subject to the unanimous approval of all the Yugoslav republics, and that even
“day-to-day economic decisions relied on the good will of each of the republics and
provinces.” 39 The crippling side effect of this arrangement was that the central
government was unable to react to economic crises. These changes, however, inflamed
rather than assuaged Croatian nationalism and led to even greater demands for control
over foreign trade, republican control of foreign currency earned, and outright economic
independence. Tito’s speech broadcast from Belgrade on April 15, 1971 foreshadowed
the problems that would besiege Yugoslavia with the adoption of the new constitutional
amendments:
Many competences will be transferred from the Federation to the republics as a result of
the adoption of the constitutional amendments. I think that this is good. However, there
are also some people who, to be factual, by invoking the amendments, aim at closing
themselves within their borders and establishing a closed market, that is, a market which
would not be unified and this is a dangerous thing. 40

Within two decades, Tito’s fears were more than realized. In the free elections, held in
1990 for the first time since World War II, nationalist parties or coalitions won majorities
in all of the Yugoslav republics. Then, in 1991 and beginning with Slovenia, the
republics began to declare and forcibly assert their total independence as separate states.
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Historiography of Yugoslav Nationalism
Since the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, there has been a flood
of scholarly works published on the subject. A popular point of inquiry—to which the
topic of this paper attests—has been the connection between the rise of ethnic
nationalism and the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. So far this study has advanced
the argument that there is a direct causal relationship between increasingly nationalist
republics and the secession of the same. While this is a widely shared position, it is not
the only one. The following section gives a sampling of some of the scholarly arguments
on this connection
Gojko Vuckovic proposes that the system of “Socialist Self-Management”
introduced into Yugoslavia in the 1950s was the primary contributor to the eruption of
violent ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia. He equates the process decentralization with the
development of consciously ethno-nationalist republics. In other words, Vuckovic finds
sufficient evidence that the process of nationalism began in the 1950, albeit slowly, and
that the events of the 1990s are best seen as a continuation of the process of
decentralization. The key event in this concept of Yugoslav disintegration is the death if
Tito in 1980 at which time the central government ceased to be an effective institution.
Vuckovic adds, however, that to this process of decentralization must be attached the
additional consideration of an “unfavorable, divided, and inconsistent international
community” in order to fully account for territorial breakup of Yugoslavia. 41
Michael Ignatieff believes that ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia is an invented
concept that creates false distinctions and fosters fear between largely similar groups of
people who would ordinarily live in peace with one another. He argues that nationalist
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politicians, such as Milosevic and Tudjman, only adopted the nationalist position because
communism stopped working. “Nationalist sentiment on the ground, among common
people,” he says, “is a secondary consequence of political disintegration, a response to
the collapse of the state order and the interethnic accommodation that made it possible.” 42
In this argument he minimizes the existence of nationalism during Tito’s reign and what
he does acknowledge he attributes to the aging generation that survived the Ustasha
genocide. To substantiate this claim he points to the growing rates or intermarriage, the
uniform application of justice by local authorities, and the status quo of peaceful
coexistence in most villages. 43
Also minimizing ethnic nationalism as the immediate cause of disintegration is
Susan Woodward. She argues that “the real origin of the Yugoslav conflict is the
disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of political and civil order.”
She further states, “The conflict is not a result of historical animosities…it is the result of
the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy.” 44
Woodward points to the economic crisis of the 1980s as being primarily responsible for
the destabilization of the country and considers nationalism to be a “dynamic” of the
growing political instability. She considers nationalism to possess an “empty vessel
character—[an] absence of program outside the insistence on political power for some
imagined community.” 45 Essentially, in Woodward’s view nationalism in the republics of
the former Yugoslavia was little more than a banner under which adherents of diverse
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political ideologies—from both the far left and right—could gather to preserve their
crumbling political power. 46
For Christopher Bennett, ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia is a concept
deliberately manufactured by the media in the 1980s in order to justify Serbia’s territorial
ambitions. He maintains that a unified Yugoslav state was the best possible arrangement
for the southern Slavs, and plays down interethnic tensions in both the Kingdom and
Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. Bennett credits Milosevic with the triggering the
disintegration of Yugoslavia by revoking the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 as part of a
program to build a greater Serbia. This is a fairly narrow perspective of the conflict—the
position that Serbia, and specifically Milosevic, is at fault for the failure of the Yugoslav
experiment—but it represents a fairly popular position in academia, and a very common
view held laypersons. 47 For example, Laura Silber and Allan Little fall in line with
Bennett with their argument that the disintegration of Yugoslavia is due primarily to
Serbian nationalism. Specifically they claim to “trace the origins of the war to the rise of
Serb nationalism among Belgrade intellectuals in the mid-1980s, and the subsequent
harnessing of nationalist rhetoric by Slobodan Milosevic.” 48
Closer to the position of this paper is Lenard Cohen. In his study of the break up
of Yugoslavia he divides the problem into two specific issues. First, “why the ‘Second
Yugoslavia’ (1945-1991) collapsed?” and second, “why [did] the disintegration of the
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federation [generate] so much violence and suffering?” 49 Cohen, like Woodward,
attributes the collapse of the Yugoslav state to the failures of its political leaders to
reestablish a functional model for political and economic coexistence among the
republics following what he calls the “pluralist revolution” of 1990. Part of this failure
consisted of the amplification of an “elite-led ethnic nationalism,” but unlike Ignatieff,
Cohen sees a difference between newly created ethnic nationalism and historically rooted
ethnic tensions. He also acknowledges the role that foreign powers played in the
disintegration, “particularly German and Austrian support for the secessionist goals of
Slovenia and Croatia, and the ‘pasted together’ diplomacy exhibited by the United States
and European Community.” 50 Cohen’s explanation of the violence associated with the
disintegration boils down to the fact that ethnic tensions existed. Without these,
nationalist political campaigns would not have sparked the violent conflicts between
individual neighbors that characterized the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He
founds his claim for the existence of ethnic tensions on evidence very much like that
presented in earlier sections of this paper.
A perspective complimentary to many of the above arguments is that nationalism
not only existed as a political policy, but that it was even institutionalized in the
constitutions of the former Yugoslav republics. Robert Hayden argues that this
“constitutional nationalism” was the solution adopted by the nationalist politicians
elected in the free elections of 1990 to solve the problem of “combining practical politics
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and nationalist ideology.” 51 This policy allowed the new states to manipulate the
institutions of democracy to favor members of an ethnic group rather than the individual
citizen, and, as Hayden points out, Croatia and Slovenia employed constitutional
nationalism most liberally. This concept of nationalism gives considerable weight to the
argument that ethnic nationalism moved through society from the top down—after all,
most villagers were not involved in the drafting of the constitutions. Identifying the
disintegration of Yugoslavia as a product dictated by the outcome of the 1990 elections
further reinforces the idea that nationalist politicians should be considered most
responsible.

A Brief Account of Serbian Nationalism
Strictly speaking, the concept of nationalism developed in Europe slowly over the
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but the nation-state did not become the
international norm until after the First World War.52 Nevertheless, a discussion of an
imagined community among Serbs must begin much earlier. Following their defeat in the
Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Serbs managed to maintain their linguistic traditions over the
ensuing centuries of foreign occupation. What accounts for this is the fact that under the
Ottomans, Serbian communities enjoyed the status of dhimmis, protected Christian or
Jewish enclaves within Islamic states. Also, as Mojmir Križan—another scholar involved
in the study of the history of Serbian nationalism—points out, “as a predominantly
illiterate peasant population lacking an intellectual and political elite, Serbs did not
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develop a productive cultural exchange with their Islamic environment.” 53 The Serbs
clung bitterly to their language for almost five centuries of Ottoman rule. Thus, even
before the advent of formal nationalism in Western Europe, Serbs imagined themselves
as a subculture within the Ottoman Empire the defining characteristic of which was their
vernacular.

54

It is not surprising, then, that once they achieved independence as their own state
in the nineteenth century the Serbs defined themselves according to linguistic (not
geographical) lines, and extended Serbian nationalist ambitions to include the
linguistically similar Croatian and Slovene regions of the Hapsburg Empire. A study of
textbooks from this period reinforces the concept of language’s central role in the
nationalist picture. A popular Serbian elementary history text from 1907, claimed the
following:
Nations are recognized by their language. However, many thousands of families who
speak the same language and understand one another comprise one nation… But a nation
is also identified by something else. For example, if you went far away, you would meet
many people who did not speak our language, were not proud of Miloš Obilić, did not
praise Kraljević Marko, did not celebrate our glories, did not attend church meetings as
we do, and did not lament Kosovo. Frequently, they would not even know about these
things. Consequently, people who speak the same language, who share the same national
pride, and remember one another wherever they may be, who have identical customs are
called a nation. 55

In his study of South Slavic nationalism, Jelavich calls attention to the linguistic issue,
but also stresses the importance of cultural practices and memory. Before proceeding to a
discussion of these elements, it is worthwhile to point out that through his examination of
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over 300 textbooks form the period prior to the First World War Jelavich determines that
“Serbian textbooks concentrated exclusively on the Serbian nation, with few attempts to
inform students about the Croats.” 56 This certainly makes sense because Serbia was an
independent kingdom and to annex the linguistically similar Croats would be seen as the
creation of a Greater Serbia. His conclusions about the Croats within the Hapsburg
Empire, however, communicate the Croatian belief that the best prospect for autonomy
lay in the creation of a southern Slavic state in on equal terms with the Serbs. Specifically
that “the Croatian textbooks stressed Serbo-Croatian linguistic and literary unity and
included basic facts about Serbian history, religion, customs and traditions.” 57 In other
words Croats viewed Serbs as separate people and potential partners in the creation of a
Serbo-Croatian nation, whereas the Serbs viewed the absorption of the Croats as the next
logical step in expanding their existing nation. This is a clear illustration of Benedict
Anderson’s concept of nationalism in action. Croatian and Serbian textbook writers both
imagined limited nation-states that included both Serbs and Croats, but they imagined the
authority of the various ethnic groups in different ways, and as Anderson points out,
sovereignty is an integral component of a nation-state. This interplay of vernacular and
issues of sovereignty emphasize the dynamic nature of imagined communities and show
that these communities are not always imagined in the same way.
Cultural memory has a strong connection with nationalism, not just in
Yugoslavia. By making the participation in an event—or on a certain side of an event—
by one’s ancestors a requirement for constituency, a nation may further limit the number
and type of people that are included in the imagined community. In general, war
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memories, and in particular the way in which a nation remembers its participation in
wars, play key roles in promoting nationalism. 58 This is especially true in the case of the
Balkans, whose history has sometimes been presented as a continual series of armed
conflicts. 59 Over time, most European nations phased out the depiction of war as a
glorious and heroic event in favor of a more realistic picture of the human and social cost
of wars. This trend was especially strong after World War II. As Jay Winter stated, “After
Hiroshima and Auschwitz, the earlier commemorative efforts [of war as a glorious event]
simply could not be duplicated.” 60 Even so, the practice of minimizing heroic accounts in
educational curricula was not adopted in Yugoslavia to any measurable degree.
According to Wolfgang Hoepken, “Military conflicts [in Yugoslavia] remained heroic
national liberation wars,” (particularly the anti-Ottoman wars) as well as a means
providing legitimacy for the current government as was seen in the case of the Tito and
his Partisans. 61 In this way, education was incorporated into the program of official
nationalism undertaken by Tito and the YLC—essentially the men running the Yugoslav
government sought to build a sense of nationalism around the Civil War, an event in
which they featured as heroes. 62
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Serbia never moved away from the concept of “war as a legitimate expression of
politics,” according to Hoepken, and education continued “to show the legitimacy of war
to fulfill national interests and to present wars as examples from the past of how to
behave and how to defend those national interests.”63 The concept of legitimating
violence applied at the lowest levels of villages and family structures at least as well as it
did for the national government, but here it was more a matter of everyday life than of a
formal education policy. For the Serbian peasant living in a Turkish empire, the use of
violence not only guaranteed his claim to the land that he worked, it was also the best
way to ensure that he would remain alive to work it. As Bogdan Denitch notes, “in these
areas, which have been subject to prolonged violence, the adaptation of the family
structures to the necessities of war and the expansion of kinship networks for the
purposes of self-defense lasted into the twentieth century.” 64 Evidence of these kinship
networks and patterns of armed resistance are clearly evident in the strategy of the
Chetnik (the Serbian nationalist) resistance movement in World War II. This strategy
depended upon local leaders to do what they had always done—ensure the security of the
local environs in which they lived and worked.65
On a related note, the use of language in the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA)
bears mentioning. Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary and balanced
recruitment throughout the republics and provinces, Serbian became the only language
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used by the YPA. The one concession made to the Croatians by the YPA on this subject
was the uniform utilization of Latin script (as opposed to Cyrillic, which is the traditional
script for the Serbian language). 66 This situation was undoubtedly responsible for further
inflaming tensions between Serbia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s two most contentious
republics. Bogdan Denitch in his book Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of
Yugoslavia indicates that there was a disproportionate number of Serbs in the officer
ranks of the YPA. He attributes this unbalance to the relative lack of economic
opportunities available to Serbs as compared to Croats and Slovenes. 67 This partially
explains the loyalty of the YPA to Serbia, but it should not be overlooked that it was,
above all, an extension of the central government. Omar Fisher notes that “in the precollapse phase of the Yugoslav crisis the army was the only state institution capable of
functioning, making an armed response virtually the only possible central response to
centrifugal tendencies.” 68 In other words, it is not clear that the YPA was functioning as a
Serbian Nationalist institution, at least not before 1991.
Finally, the most important factor in the contemporary resurgence of Serbian
nationalism was the work of the Serbian Academy of Science. In its 1986 Memorandum,
the mode by which it communicated with the political community, the Academy
proposed a nationalist political and economic campaign based upon an enumeration of
Serbian grievances. It pointed to the “long-term lagging-behind in the development of the
economy of Serbia,” the political discrimination against Serbs including under-
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representation and the relative inaccessibility of federal positions, and the “physical,
political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and
Metohija.” 69 Due to its role as a cultural institution, the Academy itself was incapable of
directly effecting changes in policy, but nevertheless the memorandum warned,
“It the Serbian People see their future in the family of cultured and civilized nations of
the world, they must find themselves anew and become a historical subject…they must
put forth a modern societal program and national program, which will inspire
contemporary and future generations.” 70

This memorandum lies at the core of the top-down, elite-led, self-pitying nationalism—
noted by scholars such as Ignatieff, Woodward, Bennett and Cohen—that swept through
the Serbian masses in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the themes raised by the Academy are
almost exactly the same as those adopted by Slobodan Milosevic. This implies that much
of the historical consciousness of Serbian victimization evident in his speeches is a
derivative of a similar trend among Serbian academics.

The Rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic
Perhaps the most central figure of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s is Slobodan
Milosevic. He is characterized in the both in the western media and in a large proportion
of academic circles as a hard-line Serbian nationalist and is blamed for inflaming Serbian
hegemonic sentiments among Serbs.
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apologize for Milosevic nor further criticize him for any political, economic, or military
aid that he gave Serbian nationalists, but rather to critically assess his use of history in his
role as spokesman of Serbian nationalism. This will be accomplished through the analysis
of a number of public speeches he made in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
On April 24, 1987 Milosevic, at that time the party chief of the Serbian
Communist Party, visited Pristina, Kosovo in place of the Serbian president Ivan
Stambolić to meet with local Party leaders. Hearing the news of his visit a crowd of some
10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins gathered to voice their complaints against the ethnic
Albanians. They grew unruly, began throwing rocks, and were held at bay by Albanian
police wielding rubber truncheons. In an attempt to defuse the situation, Milosevic
delivered an impromptu speech, the most memorable line of which, “Nobody should dare
to beat you,” became a rallying cry for Serbian nationalists in Kosovo. According to
some accounts, this is where Milosevic reputedly launched his campaign for a broader
program of Serbian nationalism. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia assembled by the United Nations claims in its indictment of Milosevic:
In meetings with local Serb leaders and in a speech before a crowd of Serbs, Slobodan
Milosevic endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda. In so doing, he broke with the party and
government policy which had restricted nationalist expression in the SFRY [Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after
the Second World War. Thereafter, Slobodan Milosevic exploited a growing wave of
Serbian nationalism in order to strengthen centralized rule in the SFRY. 72

According to other accounts, however, Milosevic stumbled into his role as the preeminent
Serbian nationalist and that “No one should dare to beat you” was, in fact, an off-hand
remark made to the police, but interpreted by the crowd of Serbs as a promise to redress
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their grievances against the Albanians that were steadily forcing them out of Kosovo.
This speech did not incorporate references to specific historical events that characterized
Milosevic’s later speeches, but did include statements such as “It was never part of the
Serbian or Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when
it’s time to fight,” and “You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and
descendants.” Regardless of whether this was a stroke of luck or a calculated move by
Milosevic, he was enthroned as the protector of Serbs and catapulted to the forefront of
the Serbian Nationalist movement. 73
In contrast, Milosevic’s famous speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of
the battle of Kosovo, the battle against the Ottomans in which the Serbs lost their
freedom, draws heavily on specific historical themes from beginning to end. 74 Even the
location where the speech was delivered, the exact field, the “Plain of the Blackbird,”
where the Battle of Kosovo was fought, was chosen for its historical significance. It is
important to note that the speech was delivered in the context of rising tensions between
the ethnically Serbian minority and the ethnically Albanian majority in the autonomous
province of Kosovo.75 The occasion itself attests to the importance of cultural memory to
the Serbs. The event, a defeat 600 years past, is still cause for commemoration. In the
speech Milosevic raises several themes, some of which were ostensibly intended to check
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Serbian nationalism. For instance he declares, “Serbia of today is united and equal to
other republics … [it] has never had only Serbs living in it…This is not a disadvantage
for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage.” He goes on to describe in
general terms the successes of other states in the international community that, like
Serbia, are composed of “different nationalities, religions, and races.”
Over the course of the speech Milosevic stressed four themes. 1) The liberational
nature of the Serbian national character; 2) the prospects for prosperity to be achieved
through unity; 3) the national divisions that currently existed in Yugoslavia; and 4) the
dignity—lost in their historic defeat—that would be regained by the achievement of
national unity. The sub-text to each of these points might be better read as 1) Serbs have
been victimized by others along ethnic lines but have not retaliated in kind; 2) Serbs will
be more prosperous in a purely Serbian state, or at least a state committed to a Serbian
agenda; 3) Serbs should not forget the historical and potential dangers posed by the other
Yugoslav peoples, and especially the minorities in the autonomous province of Kosovo;
and 4) Serbia lost its position as a European nation (thereby losing its dignity) when it
was conquered by the Ottomans, and losing authority over the ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo presents the potential for a similar disgrace. A textual analysis supports these
claims.
Milosevic admits that it is essentially impossible to know what actually occurred
at the battle of Kosovo, but that what is most significant is the way in which the battle has
been remembered by Serbs—as a moral victory and as a necessary military defeat
suffered by the Serbs in defense of European culture. This glimmer of sensitivity for
historical integrity doesn’t stop him from blaming Serbia’s loss on “lack of unity and
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betrayal.” This claim allows Milosevic to make a rhetorical leap across the centuries to
connect the “lack of unity and betrayal” that plagued Serbia at the battle of Kosovo to the
“lack of unity and betrayal” that characterized the opposing Serbian resistance
movements during World War II. The association of the two events implies that Serbia
also lost the Civil War between the Chetniks and Partisans. This reinforces the
remembered feelings of embarrassment and disillusionment felt by many Serbs after the
War. The communist party’s policy of “brotherhood and unity” prohibited the emergence
of Serbian hegemony in spite of both the numerical superiority of Serbs that participated
in the resistance movements during the Civil War when compared to other Yugoslav
ethnic groups and their privileged position in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the
interwar period. Essentially, the harm caused to Serbia by forty years of maintaining the
pretenses of friendship and equality with the Croatia, “in the historical and moral sense,
exceeded fascist aggression.”
Embarrassment at the failure of the Chetniks is artfully transformed into the virtue
or Partisan victory as Milosevic expounds the altruistic character of the Serbs. This
passage is potent enough that it bears reproduction in full:
[Serbian] national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of
history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when
they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they
are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not
used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the
Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.

The first sentence shows the historical consciousness common to the Serbian people, that
is, the perceived concurrence of ancient, recent, and present events. The second sentence
boasts of two facts: First, that Serbia obtained its independence from the Ottomans before
attempting to wrest Croatia away the Hapsburgs; and second, that it was the mostly
Serbian Partisans who succeeded in expelling the fascists of all types at the end of World
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War II. 76 The last lines of the passage are a call to Serbs in Kosovo to resist
discrimination and pressures to emigrate coming from the ethnically Albanian majority,
and a warning to that majority that those same Serbs have the ability, indeed the moral
responsibility to stand up for themselves. Milosevic goes on to declare Serbs free of the
“vassal mentality” that was imposed upon them by the Ottomans and later by Tito. His
speech omits the words “Ottomans” and “Tito,” but the implication for an audience of
discontented Serbs is clear.
Milosevic’s second theme focuses on the economic and social victimization of the
Serbian republic within Yugoslavia. While it is true that Serbia historically lagged behind
the more advanced republics of Croatia in terms of economic prosperity, especially
industrialization, Milosevic completely ignores the fact that Croatia and Slovenia were
already more industrialized than Serbia in 1918. This is one of the reasons that Croats and
Slovenes have traditionally viewed Serbia as backward which can be construed as means
of victimizing the Serbs socially. 77 Essentially, Milosevic is reminding Serbs that they
should be jealous of economic favors given to the northern republics by the Hapsburgs
that the Ottomans failed to deliver in the south. What follows, however, is difficult to
label as outright nationalism and this probably accounts for much of the potential defense
for the former Serbian president against charges of rashly promoting nationalism.

76

Military historians argue about how successful the Partisan movement would have been in its
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According to Milosevic, Serbia is enriched by is various ethnicities, and the fact
that the most developed and prosperous countries in the world are multi-ethnic serves as
his supporting evidence. In fact, he suggests that “the only differences one can and should
allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest
people and dishonest people.” This seems to be a departure from the earlier arguments
presented, but the possibility that Milosevic is making a legitimate call for the peaceful
coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo, as well as the
fair treatment of Serbs in the other republics, should not be completely discounted. It
must also be remembered that his entire political career had been tied to the Communist
Party of Serbia. Given this fact and the date of the speech (June 28, 1989, i.e. before the
general dissolution of Yugoslavia’s communist parties following the free elections in
1990), it was to be expected that Milosevic would mix traditional Socialist rhetoric with
his relatively new nationalist message. For the purposes of this investigation, however, it
is noteworthy that—besides indicating the fact that Serbia has never been entirely
populated by ethnic Serbs—Milosevic’s arguments for peace and toleration are devoid of
the strong historical links that characterize the more nationalist sections of this speech.
This trend is borne out in most his discussion concerning the significant national
differences that divided Yugoslavia. At this point, in 1989, Milosevic was at least willing
to give lip service to the idea that nationalism was the strongest divisive force that was
then threatening the stability of Yugoslavia. It is interesting though that he distinguishes
between national divisions and “social, cultural, religious and many other less important
ones,” when most accounts of ethnic nationalism in the former Yugoslavia include a
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discussion of the social, cultural, and most especially the religious components of that
nationalism. 78
The St. Vitus Day speech comes full circle to the Battle of Kosovo. The closing
paragraphs contain perhaps the most ominous messages of the speech, but all are
concealed in the subtext. Milosevic reminds his audience yet again that although the true
story of the Battle of Kosovo cannot be known, all Serbians remember—or at least
should remember—that it was disunity that led to their defeat. This strongly implies a
threat directed at the Albanian majority against being disunited with Serbia proper (that
is, Kosovar Albanians should abandon any thoughts of seceding from Serbia). This threat
is made all but explicit by Milosevic’s comment that “Six centuries later, now, we are
being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles,
although such things cannot be excluded yet.” The Serbs are thus, in effect, given the
authority by their president to engage in armed resistance to discrimination against them.
This completely contradicts his earlier rhetoric promoting the virtues of peaceful
coexistence and toleration. Finally, by having fought (and lost) the Battle of Kosovo,
Serbia proved itself “the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and
European society in general.” This claim is meant to reinforce the legitimacy of Serbian
nationalism. It asserts that Serbia is a part of Europe; that Serbia is not culturally inferior
to their neighbors to the north; and that, in fact, the rest of Europe owes them a 600 year
old debt of gratitude for slowing the Turkish advance into Europe. The themes of this
famous speech return in several of Milosevic’s later speeches.
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After the dissolution of the YLC in 1990, Milosevic formed the Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS).79 In his closing remarks at the first congress of the SPS on July 18, 1990 he
reiterated points from his St. Vitus Day speech that blamed Tito’s reign as well as other
historical circumstances for the sorry state of Serbian affairs. These points are
enumerated as follows:
bureaucratic arbitrariness, equalization of the state and the party, violence, economic
inertia, cultural isolation, aggressive intolerance of a different political opinion, longstanding hostility towards educated people and the new blindness for the concerns of
workers and farmers, inclination to nurture the personality cult at all levels, cruel political
hierarchy and cowardice. 80

The first point is a direct and fairly accurate criticism of the manner in which Tito ran
Yugoslavia. 81 The second refers to the constitutional reforms of 1974 that granted all the
federal republics and Serbia’s two autonomous provinces equal representation in the
federal government as the Republic of Serbia itself. 82 “Economic inertia” refers to the
above-noted historical differences in patterns of industrialization between the
Northwestern and Southeastern zones of Yugoslavia. Political intolerance typified the
Yugoslav government from its creation in 1918. It further eroded Milosevic’s credibility
that he suggested that his government would somehow create a solution for this problem,
as did his condemning Tito’s personality cult, as he was deeply involved in the process of
manufacturing his own. The fact that Milosevic drew attention to the issue of
“longstanding hostility towards educated people” is more problematic. On one hand this
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was likely a promise for improved relations with the members of the Serbian Academy of
the Science from whom Milosevic inherited many of the arguments that supported his
nationalist program. On the other hand, it alludes to the Chetnik practice of killing the
rural intelligentsia (see note 25), and makes sense given that Milosevic is the heir of the
communist political tradition—which also accounts for his professed concern for workers
and farmers. What is confusing, however, is the invocation of this negative image
associated with a Serbian nationalist group, the image of ignorant peasants killing rural
school-teachers, in the process of promoting a Serbian nationalist program. This
illustrates how Milosevic successfully employed positive Serbian cultural memories of
the Chetniks and Partisan to gain support while largely avoiding the stigmas associated
with both.
In his address to the Serbian Assembly on May 30, 1991, Milosevic “drew the
line” on the Kosovo issue. He refused to engage in further discussion of creating an
Albanian state in the province of Kosovo. His exact words were, “I will not agree to
justify to anyone why the Republic of Serbia is not allowing the Serbs and Montenegrins
in Kosovo-Metohija to be killed again and why we are not willing to conduct dialogue on
the possibility of creating an Albanian state on the territory of Serbia.” 83 In this refusal
two separate events occurred. First was the refusal to create an Albanian state, but the
second (and more significant for the purposes of this paper) is a declaration that the
creation of an Albanian state would necessarily entail the murder of Serbs and
Montenegrins. This second point is an extension of the position that initially gained
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Milosevic his popularity in 1987, as well as a declaration that the future will resemble the
past—that it is somehow part of the Albanian character to continue the abuses against the
Serbs in Kosovo of the 1980s, the 1930s and even the of the Ottoman Turks in the
fourteenth century. Milosevic made his resolve clear on this issue by declaring, “I want to
openly say that everyone who demands a deviation from the stands on these issues can
only achieve this by bringing down the present leadership of Serbia.” In retrospect it can
be said that with this statement Milosevic closed the door to debate and diplomacy and
threw the entire weight of the Yugoslav military behind a Serbian nationalist view of
history.
In this same address, Milosevic moves beyond the Kosovo issue to the question of
Serbs in other Republics, specifically Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in what is
arguably one of his most logical arguments and legitimate uses of historical facts and
precedents. Until the formal recognition of these two republics by the international
community the right of self-determination of Serbs living outside Serbia, at least in those
areas where they constituted a local majority was an undecided issue. Milosevic
characteristically presented the issue in terms of absolutes. He declared, “It is an
undisputable fact that the right of a people to self-determination in a multinational state
cannot be territorially limited to existing administrative borders between republics.”
What follows this absolute is, at least on the surface, a compelling argument in favor of
self-determination.
The borders between the republics within Yugoslavia have never been state borders. It is
well-known that they were drawn in the past arbitrarily and without objective criteria that is, disregarding the ethnic composition of the population, the consequences of the
genocide suffered by the Serbian people, or the norms of international law.
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The first statement is a point of contention for the Croats (see note 17), but it is true that
Yugoslavia in its first incarnation was formed by the Treaty of Versailles—largely
without regard for the right of self-determination described in Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”
that were supposed to have guided the creation of new national borders following World
War I
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—using existing Hapsburg and Ottoman administrative borders. These provincial

borders within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although carried over into the Socialist
Federation of Yugoslavia, were never intended to be definitive borders between ethnic
groups. 85 Milosevic’s reference to the “genocide suffered by the Serbian people” serves
as evidence of the evils associated with constructing an ethnically pure state along
arbitrary political boundaries. These arguments lead him to conclude,
Therefore, the right to self-determination cannot be reserved only for a majority people
in a nationally-mixed republic. If that were so, the interests of those peoples who
constitute a smaller number in a part of Yugoslav territory within the borders of
individual republics would be violated on the pretext of civil democracy.

Regardless of the actual conduct of the wars in the following years—specifically the
ethnic cleansing carried out by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina—it must be acknowledged
that Milosevic, in this case, presented a sound argument intended to safeguard the rights
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of individuals throughout Yugoslavia based upon mostly accurate historical
information. 86
By the closing statements of the Second congress of the SPS on October 24, 1992,
there were no more appeals or references made to history. 87 The implications of this fact
are unclear. It could be that such appeals were no longer effective so far as reinforcing
the legitimacy of the Milosevic government was concerned, or simply that the war at
hand provided it with more immediate examples of crimes against Serbs with which to
promote Serbian nationalist interests.

Conclusions
It seems almost elementary to state that nationalist rhetoric, like that employed by
Slobodan Milosevic, tends to utilize rose-colored histories to link heroic images of the
past to the present day, while carefully omitting accounts of wrong-doings committed by
the state that might be cause for national guilt. In this case, two specific events dominate
the Serbian historical consciousness: The loss of the battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the
victimization of the Serbs at the hands of the Ustasha and Partisans during the civil war
between 1941 and 1945. Even so, appealing to larger-than-life conflicts in a nation’s past
in order to win support for contemporary struggles is not a practice unique to Serbia.
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What is notable about the case of Serbia in particular is that almost all of its historical
consciousness is built around episodes of victimization with a 500 year gap between
significant events. Milosevic, however, should not bear the full weight of the blame for
creating this victim mentality among Serbs. To a certain extent, it already existed among
the largely uneducated masses (like the members of the Čelik family in Sudetic’s Blood
and Vengence), but its forceful revival must be attributed to politically sensitive and
historically aware members of the elite—in other words, people like the members of the
Serbian Academy of Sciences. These two groups, essentially characterized by the “Elite”
and the “Peasant,” have very different views on history. These views are intimately
connected to the problems resulting from the repression of a balanced public scholarly
discourse of important events in Yugoslavia, especially the Civil War of the 1940s, and
the lack of reconciliation between ethnic groups.
The view of history held by the Elite was capable of cataloguing and analyzing
the specific nature of historical events in much the same way as this paper has attempted
to do. Memory of specifics—for instance, the progressively anti-Serbian demographic
trend in Albania, the relative rate of Serbia’s economic grow in comparison to the other
republics, or the total number of Serbs killed by the Ustasha—belong to a select group of
individuals including the members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. This group was
also capable of tailoring accounts of history to foster nationalism in service of specific
political agendas. 88 Slobodan Milosevic was perhaps the best example of this type of
individual.
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This sometimes included a redefinition of the imagined limits of the community. For example,
by emphasizing the similarities between the various Slavic groups and historical examples of cooperation
among the same, Tito attempted to foster a sense of Yugoslav nationalism. In contrast, Milosevic inspired
Serbian nationalism by emphasizing historic examples of the victimization of Serbs.
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Conversely, for the Peasant history is mostly limited to folk legends and familial
experiences. Folk histories generally have heroes, villains, and a clear sense of morality,
and it is for this reason precisely that Milosevic’s nationalist speeches include accounts of
the Battle of Kosovo and the “Serbian character.” His rhetoric appealed to the masses
because it was devoid of all the ambiguities with which the elite were concerned. An
average Serbian villager in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not likely to care about the political
differences between the Chetniks and the Partisans if he knew (or believed) that a
member of the Ustasha killed his father and uncles. Before these people were bombarded
by the media with nationalist rhetoric, they lived with inter-ethnic tensions at the
individual level but were unable (or unwilling) to vent them. This is precisely why the
political policy of official nationalism became especially violent in the ethnically mixed
rural areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Essentially, politics lit the fuse on a bomb
of ethnic tensions that had never been defused through a policy of reconciliation
following the Civil War of the 1940s. In fact, Tito’s “Brotherhood and Unity” policy
deliberately turned a blind eye on the issue of ethnic tensions.
From an objective (or at least non-Yugoslav) standpoint it should be noted, that
the lack of positive cultural memories shared by a majority of the Yugoslav peoples
likely precluded the creation of a viable multi-ethnic state. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, Croatia and Serbia, which would become the most contentious of the
federal republics, shared no common history. Each had been dominated by a different
empire for over half a millennium. By the end of the twentieth century this fact had
changed and the two republics shared a history of seventy years of political wrangling for
power in the various manifestations of the Yugoslav government. Even more detrimental

43
to the prospect of Yugoslav unity was the fact that Croatian fascists and Serbian
traditionalists fought on opposite sides of a horribly brutal war, a war that both lost to the
Partisans who did not allow their victory to be claimed by either national group. Neither
Tito nor Milosevic nor any other nationalist politician was ever able to conjure up a
convincing account that acknowledged Yugoslavia’s multitude of historical tribulations
and still tied Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Bosnians, Slovenians, and all the other ethnic
groups together in a positive way.
What emerges from this investigation is not so much a caution against omission
of national guilt by ideologically motivated politicians or even against the abuse of
history, but rather a warning against the naïve attempt to foster nationalist sentiments
among peoples who never shared common historical experiences or that share a history
of abuse and victimization. This point is particularly relevant when one considers current
nation-building efforts that are taking place all over the world today. After all, if Croats,
Bosnians, and Serbs cannot share a sense of nationalism that bridges their distinct cultural
traditions, cannot imagine themselves as a community despite their ethnic differences,
how can the world expect other multi-ethnic states, for instance, Iraq—a state composed
of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites—to succeed?
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